14 November, 2007
Why are Abbas and Olmert playing the Bush/Condi Annapolis charade? For Abbas it’s about the courage: the courage to finally assert control, if he is able, first over Fateh and the machinery of governance he inherited from Arafat. Should he achieve that he must then abandon his obviously failed two year-long effort to appease Hamas and the other extremist groups in the Territories and beyond, to absorb them under the umbrella of Palestinian political unity. A leader capable of leading is the precondition for any possibility of negotiating statehood with Israel.
For Olmert it is also about courage. Outside of Bush Administration pressure there is no logical reason for Israel to expend time and emotion on a pre-acknowledged fantasy. Years of “negotiating” with the Palestinians have produced naught but a weak, if apparently dovish successor to Arafat’s hawk. Olmert must know that, even if a Palestine track offered a possibility of success, still the Syrians are far more important to Israel’s security and strategic needs. Olmert must demonstrate the courage to respond to the public overtures of Baathist Syria, to test President Assad’s seriousness and ability to deliver across the negotiating table. As prime minister an guardian of the state he must take the politically unpopular but necessary step of finally accepting the cost of peace with Syria already agreed to by Israel in 2,000, the return of the Golan. Or would he be alone in exploring the Syrian option. Defense Minister Barak, Military Intelligence and the IDF all agree in assessing Syria sincere in its desire to negotiate peace.
As to Bush and Rice, they have spent the past seven years destabilizing the Middle East, devoting the past four years concentrating their efforts on destabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan. Had they the capacity for diplomatic foresight and strategic thinking they might have understood that neutralizing those two traditional enemies of the Islamic Republic would unleash the Sh’ia Iranian tiger to threaten the Sunni oil producers across the Gulf; to support anti-Lebanon and anti-Israel terror through their allies, Hezbollah and Hamas; and, in fact, to openly challenge the US in the Iraqi civil war that followed President Bush’s declaration of victory. By their actions Bush/Rice encouraged by incompetence Iranian nuclear ambitions, providing that country yet another and credible weapon with which to threaten her neighbors and the Gulf shipping lanes supplying a world economy dependent on oil. And then there was the single significant Bush contribution to the Israel-Palestine quagmire, his insistence against the advice of Abbas and Olmert, that the Palestinian elections take place with Hamas. Of course Hamas won as Olmert and Abbas had tried to warn the president. And eventually Gaza was separated from Palestine. Enter the Annapolis peace conference.
The list of Bush-bungling is endless. The obvious conclusion for Olmert should be that Israeli priorities must take precedence over pandering to this failed American president. And while Palestine may be important to Bush/Rice as a final effort to achieve some appearance of success, no matter how small and temporary, as they slink out of office, for Israel the strategic future is with Syria.
What makes Syria strategically important? In the first place, in regards to a Palestinian peace, Syria houses and protects Palestinian anti-peace terror precisely to assure that Syria will not be left in the cold to face Israel alone. Syrian policy has long been, Syria First, then Palestine. But beyond the obvious if, as MI and the IDF suggest, a Syrian peace is possible then negotiations would certainly include removing Iran from Syria and the Levant and expelling anti-peace Palestinians from Damascus (both of which Asad has signaled would serve him as well). A Syrian peace would also open the door to a dialogue with the Saudis and the extended Arab world; it would reduce the constant distraction of possible war on Israel’s northern frontier.
Should a Syrian peace be achieved then trade with Syria and the Arab world would open new and untapped markets for Israeli goods and services, unleashing the full potential of Israel’s economy. The reduced threat of war would mean fewer reservist call-ups and, as a result, lower taxes and increased manpower hours available to grow the economy.
The cost for peace with Syria was formally accepted by Israel seven years ago, recognized as pre-condition years earlier. Negotiating with Palestine is, in the foreseeable future, a waste of time, energy and emotion. Peace with Syria is Israel’s next diplomatic challenge. It’s time to accept the challenge.
Showing posts with label Syria. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Syria. Show all posts
Thursday, July 17, 2008
The US, Israel and the phony road to peace
19 August, 2007
One may forgive the Bush Administration for failing to recognize that there is zero possibility of Israel and the Palestinians entering serious negotiations any time soon. But how explain the Israel government’s participation towards this goal?
Long before Hamas did its land grab in Gaza and seceded from the PA, infighting within the governing Fateh party made even the control of territories under their control shaky at best. Responding to the primary condition of the Bush Roadmap, Abbas long insisted he had neither the political nor popular support to reign in Hamas terror. What possibility then that he could deliver the political unity and support needed to engage in talks leading to peace with Israel and statehood for Palestine? But that was yesterday. Today, now that there are two competing Palestinian governments each claiming to represent roughly half the total population; with whom should Israel negotiate, the more unified and stable Hamas, or the chronically fragmented and unpopular Fateh?
Even before Bush insisted a year ago that Israel and Abbas overcome their fears that popular and democratic elections in the Territories would result in a Hamas win; peace talks were already at a standstill with little hope for the future. Palestinian politicians were unable to even agree to terms of peace among themselves; how expect them to agree to terms of peace with the outside enemy, Israel? Palestine today is generations away from achieving the internal stability necessary to even think of a unifying policy towards Israel. And until that minimal governmental threshold is achieved there is no point in expecting them to be “credible partners in peace.”
So how explain the familiar, but always new-sounding slogans of commitment to the Road Map, to Palestinian Independence, to Peace? The motives of the Bush Administration are fairly transparent. This presidency has demonstrated total incompetence and amateurism in the area of war and diplomacy. It hungers for at least one “victory” to point to as it leaves office. It clings to that last straw of hope. But whatever this presidency touches turns out opposite to the anticipated. The Bush “faith-based” push for “democracy” and “justice” in the Middle East has left in its wake nothing but political and social chaos, Muslim extremism at every turn.
By invading Afghanistan and Iraq, Bush removed the distraction of two long-time enemies of Iran, thereby allowing the Islamic Republic to concentrate on other matters, other ambitions. Thanks to Bush Iran was now in a position to pursue its hegemonic ambitions in the region, emboldened to pursue a nuclear potential giving credibility to those claims. It could now threaten its regional neighbors Israel and the Arabian Peninsula, openly challenge America’s presence in Iraq, support indigenous and foreign elements at war with the invaders and each other inside Iraq, and elsewhere.
With this long and consistent trail of failure it is no wonder that Bush would be willing to take one last throw of the dice in the forlorn hope of at least a single diplomatic success. But Palestine-Israel, Mr. President, is just another presidential pipedream.
And Israel. Surely after six decades Israeli politicians have enough experience to know the illusion for what it is. So what purpose Palestine as “peace partner?” Can it be that dealing with the fleeting chimera of negotiations on this front frees her politicians of the responsibility of defying the pie-in-the-sky American administration and taking on the responsibility of possibly substantive negotiations with its far more important and likely peace partner in Syria? Certainly the costs of that peace, the return of Golan, have already been agreed to by successive Israeli governments.
As rumors of war increase along Israel’s northern frontier, would anything act as effectively to calm those fears than for the two states to sit down at the negotiating table to iron out what are described as relatively few and minor details to agreements already achieved between the adversaries over the years? Not only might this result in removing a perennial threat to Israel’s northern border but the agreements would also address other, and more regional issues such as Iran. All Israeli intelligence seems to agree that Syria is threatened by its dependency on that aggressive, but only ally, that it would welcome a way to extricate itself from the Iranian grip. Peace between Syria and Israel holds the potential of pushing Iranian influence back to the international boundary, distant both from Israel, and as a threat to the Arabian Peninsula from the north.
Peace with Syria holds the promise also of breakthrough to what has been called the Saudi Initiative, the opening to peace and integration into the Middle East which has been the elusive strategic goal of Israel since 1949.
One may forgive the Bush Administration for failing to recognize that there is zero possibility of Israel and the Palestinians entering serious negotiations any time soon. But how explain the Israel government’s participation towards this goal?
Long before Hamas did its land grab in Gaza and seceded from the PA, infighting within the governing Fateh party made even the control of territories under their control shaky at best. Responding to the primary condition of the Bush Roadmap, Abbas long insisted he had neither the political nor popular support to reign in Hamas terror. What possibility then that he could deliver the political unity and support needed to engage in talks leading to peace with Israel and statehood for Palestine? But that was yesterday. Today, now that there are two competing Palestinian governments each claiming to represent roughly half the total population; with whom should Israel negotiate, the more unified and stable Hamas, or the chronically fragmented and unpopular Fateh?
Even before Bush insisted a year ago that Israel and Abbas overcome their fears that popular and democratic elections in the Territories would result in a Hamas win; peace talks were already at a standstill with little hope for the future. Palestinian politicians were unable to even agree to terms of peace among themselves; how expect them to agree to terms of peace with the outside enemy, Israel? Palestine today is generations away from achieving the internal stability necessary to even think of a unifying policy towards Israel. And until that minimal governmental threshold is achieved there is no point in expecting them to be “credible partners in peace.”
So how explain the familiar, but always new-sounding slogans of commitment to the Road Map, to Palestinian Independence, to Peace? The motives of the Bush Administration are fairly transparent. This presidency has demonstrated total incompetence and amateurism in the area of war and diplomacy. It hungers for at least one “victory” to point to as it leaves office. It clings to that last straw of hope. But whatever this presidency touches turns out opposite to the anticipated. The Bush “faith-based” push for “democracy” and “justice” in the Middle East has left in its wake nothing but political and social chaos, Muslim extremism at every turn.
By invading Afghanistan and Iraq, Bush removed the distraction of two long-time enemies of Iran, thereby allowing the Islamic Republic to concentrate on other matters, other ambitions. Thanks to Bush Iran was now in a position to pursue its hegemonic ambitions in the region, emboldened to pursue a nuclear potential giving credibility to those claims. It could now threaten its regional neighbors Israel and the Arabian Peninsula, openly challenge America’s presence in Iraq, support indigenous and foreign elements at war with the invaders and each other inside Iraq, and elsewhere.
With this long and consistent trail of failure it is no wonder that Bush would be willing to take one last throw of the dice in the forlorn hope of at least a single diplomatic success. But Palestine-Israel, Mr. President, is just another presidential pipedream.
And Israel. Surely after six decades Israeli politicians have enough experience to know the illusion for what it is. So what purpose Palestine as “peace partner?” Can it be that dealing with the fleeting chimera of negotiations on this front frees her politicians of the responsibility of defying the pie-in-the-sky American administration and taking on the responsibility of possibly substantive negotiations with its far more important and likely peace partner in Syria? Certainly the costs of that peace, the return of Golan, have already been agreed to by successive Israeli governments.
As rumors of war increase along Israel’s northern frontier, would anything act as effectively to calm those fears than for the two states to sit down at the negotiating table to iron out what are described as relatively few and minor details to agreements already achieved between the adversaries over the years? Not only might this result in removing a perennial threat to Israel’s northern border but the agreements would also address other, and more regional issues such as Iran. All Israeli intelligence seems to agree that Syria is threatened by its dependency on that aggressive, but only ally, that it would welcome a way to extricate itself from the Iranian grip. Peace between Syria and Israel holds the potential of pushing Iranian influence back to the international boundary, distant both from Israel, and as a threat to the Arabian Peninsula from the north.
Peace with Syria holds the promise also of breakthrough to what has been called the Saudi Initiative, the opening to peace and integration into the Middle East which has been the elusive strategic goal of Israel since 1949.
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